

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
		6 Dec 57
TO: Deputy Director/Intelligence		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
354	Admin	
REMARKS:		
<p>In addition to DCI, copies are distributed to ONE, OCI, DDP, SR Division, IG, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] 25X1A9a</p> <p><i>DBD</i></p> <p><i>This is too much in the estimate field and consistency of the issuance of NIE 11-457 so not being passed to DCI now</i></p>		
FROM: Chief, SRS/DDI		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION
304	2210 E St	2455

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
		12 Dec 57
TO: Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick <i>GEN. DUNFORD</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
231	Admin	
REMARKS:		
<p>The attached memorandum was prepared without reference to, and prior to our receipt of NIE 11-4-57. The tone impact and in some respects the judgments of the memo are quite different from the Estimate reflecting the general speculative approach of this Staff. In the light of the buckslips, it would seem desirable to clarify the SRS charter which defines our activity as "in part intelligence, in part estimation, and in part speculation on policy." (IAC-D-99, para. 5). In the meantime, I propose to rewrite and expand this as a summary of SRS-6 (which is needed) and (over)</p>		
FROM: Chief, SRS/DDI		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION
304	2210 E St	2455

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
		DEC 9 1957
TO: Chief SRS/DDI		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
304	2210 E St.	
REMARKS:		
<p><i>See Mr. Amory's note on lower buckslip.</i></p>		
FROM: O/DO/1		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION
354	Admin	703

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
	UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	Deputy Director/Intelligence		
2	Director of Central Intelligence		
3			
4			
5			
6			
ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	
Remarks: This speculation was inspired by the press accounts of your briefing before the Senate Committee. Possibly, if the proper occasion presented itself, it might be of value to the Senators to have a briefing on non-military capabilities of the USSR.			
<i>DBD</i> DBD			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
Chief, SRS/DDI			x-2455
UNCLASSIFIED			CONFIDENTIAL
			SECRET
			(40)

FORM NO. 237
1 APR 55Replaces Form 30-4
which may be used.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1955—O-342531

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 December 1957

Speculation on the Gross Capabilities of the USSR in the Non-Military Field

This memorandum is an attempt to apply in the non-military fields of intelligence the concept of gross capabilities. The study does not concern itself with net capabilities resultant from Free World resistance and counteraction.

The following theses are derived from speculative judgments of the Senior Research Staff which, for the most part, have been presented in earlier disseminated studies. They also are intended to set the guide lines of a broad projective study extending SRS-6, "Status and Prospects of International Communism."

1. Nikita Khrushchev has successfully conducted a power struggle, comparable in brilliance and ruthlessness to that of Stalin. At present he appears to be the most powerful political figure in the world. While his situation continues to be charged with grave dangers, there is no reason to believe that he will cope with them any less boldly and resourcefully than he has in the past. Although there are several contrasting aspects in his character, these are not in serious contradiction, and he displays great unity of purpose and ability to concentrate on a wide variety of dispersed actions. Although his age (63) may preclude a long tenure of power, his health and vigor should permit at least ten effective years in which to stabilize his regime and insure an orderly succession.

2. The 40th Anniversary Celebration in Moscow was a triumph of the Soviet Union as the leader of the Communist Bloc. Mao, though the object of deference, was placed in the second rank even more firmly than had generally been anticipated and was, in effect, forbidden to extend Chinese influence further within International Communism. The Satellite leaders, with the partial exception of Gomulka, are now firmly committed to the neo-Stalinist line of Khrushchev and have begun a major attack on "revisionism" and other forms of deviation. Even Gomulka is safely contained; he has expressed his general satisfaction with the outcome of the 40th Anniversary Celebration, especially the strongly anti-Western Peace Manifesto which he is reported to have drafted. The unity of the Bloc has been affirmed in terms more flexible and realistic than would have been possible under Stalin, and for that reason it is probably stronger than ever.

DOCUMENT NO. 9

NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 1

11-11-CLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C

NOT REVIEWED DATE: 1992

FILE NUMBER:

DATE: June 1982

REVIEWER: 103430

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3. Soviet leadership of the International Communist movement was reaffirmed and accepted by all Communist Parties except the Yugoslav. Even here, however, Khrushchev appears to have gained in that Tito is more firmly confined to limbo than he was before. The establishment of a new International Communist periodical and news service indicates that cohesion in the "socialist camp" has been successfully reestablished and that the effects of Stalin's denigration and the uprisings in Poland and Hungary, for all practical purposes, have faded. In fact, the International Communist Movement has stabilized itself to such a degree that an ostensibly loose association of nations with Communist regimes, a "socialist commonwealth," is probably emerging. Although the Moscow Manifesto has said nothing about it, it is almost certain that the assembled Communist top leaders have agreed to develop such a commonwealth over a period of time. The organization which will be created to publish the new journal, however carefully it may avoid the aspect of a revived Cominform, will serve to provide this new movement a focal point of departure. It could also mask a strengthening of the existing world-wide covert subversive apparatus. In view of these developments, International Communism, having overcome a period of crisis and having found its way back to its fountainhead, Moscow, is now stronger than ever.

4. International Communism has scored a number of major advances and appears to be on the verge of others. It has become increasingly apparent that the impact of Soviet successes is cumulative, and may lead to explosive chain reactions among the neutralist or unaligned nations. This is apparent in Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia where the Communists are the most likely beneficiaries of the failure to comprehend the essentials of constitutional democracy and the resulting drift toward anarchy. The possibility of a "peaceful" takeover of power, proclaimed at the 20th CPSU Congress, must not be excluded even in India. The danger of a "breakthrough" of Communism, identified or confused with Arab nationalism in the Middle East, needs no comment. Even in Western Europe, International Communism is a present threat. In Italy it appears to have gained strength rather than to have lost, as was widely predicted after Hungary. Within the PSI, the left or philo-Communist wing appears to be ascendant, partly as a result of recent Soviet triumphs, partly as a result of the rebuff of their moves toward reconciliation with Democratic Socialism. There is every reason to believe that Communism in Italy and France will continue to vitiate the democratic

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

process, and in the event of world depression or of probable further Soviet technological, economic and political advances, to threaten the relative stability of these two countries. Assimilating currents of anti-American nationalism, the Communist tide is also mounting ominously in Brazil and other Latin American countries. Large parts of Africa are in danger. Particularly disturbing is the success of International Communism, throughout these areas, in appropriating to its own uses the word democracy. On the one hand it has been able to pose as itself a "democratic" force and to champion such muddied concepts as Sukarno's "guided democracy." On the other hand it has to some extent been able to discredit and compromise the term with those who are its true proponents.

5. The Soviet Union as a state is advancing powerfully. Khrushchev seems to have gained rather than lost momentum by his drastic political coups. Politically, the Communist Party is supreme. It fully controls all potential centers of subsidiary power, the secret police, the army, the economic and intellectual hierarchies and the youth. Its cadres are more expert and ambitious than ever, and probably more loyal to the regime. Discontent has either been dissolved by propaganda and triumphant actions or firmly checked by disciplinary measures. There is no visible threat to the regime's stability.

6. Communist ideology and Soviet patriotism have been welded more tightly by the 40th Anniversary celebration. Although the initial fervor of Marxism-Leninism has subsided, it remains the basic creed of a crusading "secular religion" which has become increasingly identified with the interest of the Soviet Union as a nation-state. Pride in the achievements of the Soviet Revolution is heightened by a sense of unlimited potential. Imperialistic and messianic traditions of the Great Russian peoples are also included in this dynamic complex.

7. There is no reason to expect an "erosion" or "mellowing process" to take place in the Soviet leadership. If anything, its drive will heighten as the goal of world domination seems nearer. There may be an increasing stabilization and bureaucratization of society and administration, but this will not abate the expansionist impulse.

8. The economic prospects for the USSR are impressive. The industrial reorganization may encounter some difficulties, but these will not prevent a continuing rapid growth of the economy. The

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

projected curves of both industrial and agricultural production show real signs of converging with those of the West in the "historically short time" which has been proclaimed. While the Soviet economy obviously cannot accomplish everything that is claimed for it, it should over the next twenty years be able: (a) to match the production of either Western Europe or the US (though not both combined); (b) sustain any armament level necessary for Soviet security; (c) provide a steadily expanding standard of living for Soviet citizens, probably equaling that of the Western European, if not the American people; (d) uplift the economies of the Satellites to the point where discontent with low standards of living would cease to be a danger to the solidarity of the Bloc, while increasingly close integration would accelerate the process of "catching up with the USA"; (e) provide ample means for economic aid to a large number of underdeveloped countries on a scale sufficient to put us politically on the defensive.

9. The full implications of Soviet scientific and technical education are still imperfectly grasped by the West. Although the development of a highly educated upper and middle class may promote an increasingly critical spirit, it will nevertheless contribute to the efficiency and dynamics of the Soviet system, especially if it goes on from one spectacular success to another.

10. In sum, within a framework of "peaceful coexistence" imposed by nuclear deterrence, the world movement headed by Nikita Khrushchev (and probably by his successors), would appear justified, in terms of its gross capabilities, in believing that it has a good prospect of achieving its goal of world domination.

25X1A9a

[Redacted]
Chief, SRS/DDI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~